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Somewhat reminding of Japan’s kamikaze pilots from the same era, the
Japanese navy armed in World War II some of their submarines with
manned torpedoes that offered no chances of survival for its one-man
crew.1 The pilots of these Kaitens, sacrificed for what proved to be a rather
modest increase in accuracy, did not have much of a choice, given the all-
pervasiveness of the Japanese shame culture of that time. More recently,
video testaments have maneuvered potential suicide bombers into a pos-
ition that is somewhat akin to that of the Kaiten or Kamikaze pilot. Such
testaments function not only as propaganda; they also make it difficult to
abort one’s mission without massive loss of face. Today, we see the rise of
what is essentially the opposite of the manned torpedo or suicide bomber:
the rise of unmanned vehicles that make it possible to engage the enemy
from a very safe distance – the pilots of drones like the Predator or Reaper,
for instance, although wearing flight suits, do “service their target” with-
out leaving their cubicle in, say, Nevada.2
This use of unmanned systems, although reducing the risks for military
personnel involved to about zero, is on first sight not very different (as long
as such systems are not fully autonomous that is) from using an aircraft to
drop a bomb from a high altitude. Their rise seems to be part of a larger
trend: several authors have noted, probably foremost Martin Shaw in his
The New Western Way of War, that politicians and militaries in the West
generally see casualties among the local population as less important than
casualties among own military personnel or among Western civilians liv-
1.
1 Ian Miller, The Mystery of Courage (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press,
2000), 273–276.
2 Peter Singer, Wired For War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the Twenty-First
Century (New York: Penguin Press, 2009), 329.
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ing in the country of deployment.3 Although “we consider it a worse
moral error if the police were to injure or kill innocent bystanders than for
them to fail to apprehend suspected criminals at large,” in military mis-
sions in far-away countries it is not considered a worse moral error to kill
or injure innocents “than to fail to apprehend suspected terrorists, or even
belligerents,” writes military ethicist Timothy Challans.4 The general pub-
lic, weighing the safety of its own society against that of faraway individu-
als, appears to accept this development. This stands in rather strong con-
trast to the universalist ambitions behind many of such interventions, yet
most politicians, militaries and populations at large in the West do see it
that way, and that explains the contemporary emphasis on maximum force
protection and relatively safe ways of delivering firepower, such as artillery
and high-flying bombers. This reduction in risk for own military person-
nel, by the use of UAV’s and otherwise, raises some ethical questions, of
course.5 One could imagine, for instance, that the military profession be-
comes a less honorable one, as honor often involves acting against one’s
own self-interest to further a higher interest.
Some militaries are aware of that problem, and attempt to draw the use
of drones into the realm of honor. In an article in The New York Times, for
instance, we read how
[f]or years, the military’s drone pilots have toiled in obscurity from
windowless rooms at bases in suburban America, viewed by some in
the armed forces more as video game players than as warriors. But in a
reflection of their increasingly important role under President Obama,
the drone operators will now be eligible for military honors akin to
those given to pilots who flew over the battlefields of Iraq and
Afghanistan.6
3 Martin Shaw, The New Western Way of War (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), 79–88;
see also Peter Olsthoorn, Military Ethics and Virtues: An Interdisciplinary Approach
for the 21st Century (London/New York: Routledge 2010).
4 Timothy Challans, Awakening Warrior: Revolution in the Ethics of Warfare (Albany:
State University of New York Press, 2007), 17–18.
5 See for an overview Peter Olsthoorn and Lambèr Royakkers, “Risks and Robots –
some ethical issues,” Conference paper for The Ethics of Emerging Military Tech-
nologies, The International Society for Military Ethics, held at the University of
San Diego, 2011, accessed March 21, 2019, http://isme.tamu.edu/ISME11/Olsthoor
n-ISME2011.pdf.
6 Michael S. Schmidt, “Pentagon Will Extend Military Honors to Drone Operators
Far From Battles,” The New York Times, January 6, 2016, A 15.
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This new award can also be conferred to operators who launch a cyber-at-
tack, the article continues. Although all of this – honoring what are some-
times somewhat derogatively called cubicle warriors – might sound some-
what odd to many people, it fits well with the just mentioned develop-
ment of ways of war fighting in which soldiers run less risk – in the same
article we read that “[a]ccording to the Pentagon, the first seven Medal of
Honor awards for service in Iraq and Afghanistan were given to those who
had died. But since 2010, all 10 people who have received the Medal of
Honor have been living at the time it was awarded.”
This chapter delves into the question to what extent risk and honor are
related pillars of the military profession, and whether eliminating risk
would thus make the profession a less honorable one. To that end, the next
two sections explain briefly what honor is and what role it still has in to-
day’s military. The section thereafter elaborates on the topic of drones and
the potential consequences to the honorableness of the military profession,
and is followed by a short conclusion.
What honor is
After a long period of near neglect, honor has recently received quite some
attention from political philosophers.7 To most people, however, the no-
tion will probably still seem somewhat out of date – sociologist Peter Berg-
er famously wrote about honor’s obsolescence.8 It is easy to overlook how
novel this obsolescence is. Honor was deemed very important in the West
all through the nineteenth century, and the honor driven practice of duel-
ing – getting a shot at revenge after being disrespected – even survived well
into the twentieth century.9 But especially insofar as it is seen as something
that depends on the good opinion of others, honor has lost much of its ap-
2.
7 Six fairly recent examples are Kwame Anthony Appiah, The Honor Code (New
York: W. W. Norton, 2010); Anthony Cunningham, Modern Honor: A Philosophical
Defense (New York: Routledge, 2013); Sharon Krause, Liberalism with Honor (Cam-
bridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2002); Peter Olsthoorn, Honor in Political and
Moral Philosophy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2015); Robert L.
Oprisko, Honor: A Phenomenology (New York: Routledge, 2012); and William Ses-
sions, Honor for Us: A Philosophical Analysis, Interpretation and Defense (New York:
Continuum, 2010).
8 Peter Berger, “On the Obsolescence of the Concept of Honour,” in Liberalism and
its Critics, ed. Michael Sandel (New York: New York University Press, 1984).
9 See also Mika LaVaque-Manty, “Dueling for Equality: Masculine Honor and the
Modern Politics of Dignity,” Political Theory, 34 (2006): 715–740.
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peal since then. The notion is thought to have become seriously out of
date, at least outside the military and some other pockets of resistance,
while the term itself has just about disappeared from our moral language.
We tend to think that people are to do the right thing for their own sake,
and not for the sake of keeping face. That it allows the opinions of others
to have a role in determining what is right and moral discredited honor
probably more than the fact that in the past honor often endorsed rather
eccentric behavior (dueling, for instance). At the same time, it is evident
that the wish to be well thought of still motivates many people, but this is
seen as regrettably falling short of the ideals of autonomy and authenticity.
Most modern philosophy mirrors (and to some extent feeds) these modern
ideals. It is remarkable that despite the recent increase in attention for hon-
or, most philosophers and ethicists still do not have much to say on this
wish to be well thought of as a motivator, both for the good and the bad.
This somewhat old-fashioned sounding notion of honor is rather differ-
ent from the more modern notion of conscience. Especially in its modern
understanding as an “inner voice,” conscience is more demanding than
honor, requiring a fair amount of moral autonomy (it might prompt
someone to go against social norms). Honor, different from conscience,
has an important external component as it concerns both the value that
someone allocates to himself and the value others place on him.10 It is only
in his or her relationships with others that it becomes clear whether some-
one is a man or woman of honor. This inauthentic side of honor also
shows from the fact that honor can be a reward for making the right
choice between higher interests and self-interest. In its ultimate form it
might mean the choice between life and death. The honorable choice is of-
ten, although not always, the choice against life and honor is the reward
for making the right choice. As Leo Braudy put it in From Chivalry to Ter-
rorism: “Historically, it is the concept of honor that mediates between indi-
vidual character and outside forces, as well as the body that wants to sur-
vive and the mind that seeks other goals, including a glorious death”11. Af-
ter the arrest of Captain Francesco Schettino for abandoning his passen-
gers when his ship, the Costa Concordia, sank on 13 January 2012, the
chairman of the Swedish Maritime Officer’s Association stated that “[i]t’s a
10 See for instance Charles H. Cooley, Human Nature and the Social Order, Revised
Edition (New York: Scribner, 1922), 238.
11 Leo Braudy, From Chivalry to Terrorism: War and the Changing Nature of Mas-
culinity. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), 49.
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matter of honor that the master is the last to leave. Nothing less will do in
this profession.”12
That such utterances about honor sound somewhat archaic to us nowa-
days is partly a result of Thomas Hobbes’ theory that people are mainly
driven by self-interest,13 thus reducing honor to an important yet selfish
(and dangerous) motive that is hard to distinguish from vanity; this fatally
undermined the ethic of honor that had been very important in the intel-
lectual thought of the two millennia before Hobbes. His economic view of
man proved so influential that two centuries after Hobbes, Alexis de Toc-
queville noticed that people in his time saw only self-interested motives at
work in their own behavior, even when it was according to Tocqueville
clear that in fact more noble motives were involved. As far as honor still
has a role in modern times it is the quiet virtues that are held in honor, at
the expense of the “turbulent” ones that bring glory but also trouble to a
society. Especially “martial valor is little esteemed,” Tocqueville noticed.14
According to Francis Fukuyama, the “struggle for recognition has shifted
from the military to the economic realm, where it has the socially benefi-
cial effect of creating rather than destroying wealth.”15 Although some do-
mains of modern life, such as politics, business, and sports, are still diffi-
cult to understand without taking honor into account, our present-day un-
derstanding of ourselves is to a great extent colored by this economic view.
It is in line with that economic view of man that Michael Walzer ob-
serves that “honor and chivalry seem to play only a small part in contem-
porary combat,” supposedly because “popular passion overcame aristocrat-
ic honor.”16 And to a certain extent, Walzer seems right: when honor is
mentioned in a military context, such as in the well-known West Point cre-
do “Duty, Honor, Country,” most of the times something else is meant:
honor at West Point is closer to the modern notion of conscience as an in-
ner voice, outlined above. Cadets are expected to adhere to the code of
honor (a cadet will not lie, cheat, steal, or tolerate those who do) because
they accept it, not because they are concerned about what others might
12 The remark can be found at http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/skippers-e
mbarrassed-costa-concordia-captain-failure-article-1.1008626, accessed March 26,
2019 [in the U.S.].
13 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (London: Penguin Books, 1988).
14 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday,
1969), 620–622.
15 Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (New
York: Free Press, 1995), 7.
16 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, 1992), 35.
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think of them when they breach it. A closer look, however, shows that the
military might be one of honor’s few remaining strongholds in our time.
Honor in the military
In more than one aspect, the ethos of the military is somewhat at odds
with that of Western society at large. The military has a rather collectivist
outlook,17 and its ethic traditionally stresses the supremacy of the group
over the individual. This ethic centers for an important part around values
like duty, honor, and country, and emphasizes the notion of self-sacrifice.
Moreover, military men and women seem to share a rather pessimistic and
conservative outlook on human nature, seeing man as essentially selfish
and weak.18 That probably explains why honor still finds a more fertile
ground in the military than in larger society: in the military honor is
deemed necessary as both an incentive to overcome the inherent weakness-
es of man and a check to the “softening” influence of a society that is
sometimes seen as lacking in order, hedonistic, and materialistic.19
This hedonism and materialism is what some see as characteristic of the
competing economic (and individualistic) view of man, mentioned above,
which is thought to prevail today in general society, and that has some
glaring shortcomings when it comes to understanding the motivation of
military personnel – basically, it is much too narrow. Aristotle already stat-
ed that professional, salaried soldiers who attach more value to their own
safety than to their good name fight well against weaker opponents, but
are the first to fly when the danger becomes too great.20 That in real life
professional soldiers do not run away is because they are evidently not mo-
tivated by the wish to save life and limbs alone. Especially in the military,
courage often springs from a concern for one’s personal honor.
This is a very old insight indeed, going back to, at least, the Romans; Ci-
cero wrote, perhaps somewhat pompously to modern ears, that “brave
men do not feel wounds in the line of battle, or if they feel them, prefer
death rather than move one step from the post that honor has appoint-
3.
17 Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Mili-
tary Relations (New York: Vintage Books, 1964), 79.
18 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 63.
19 See for instance Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, a Social and Political Por-
trait (Glencoe: Free Press, 1960), 248.
20 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1116b.
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ed.”21 They thus did not only discern something noble in the longing for
honor and a name that never dies, they also (as the Cicero quote already
indicated) ascribed an important function to it in war. The Romans
thought that no one would risk his or her life for the greater good, unless
there was honor to be lost or won. In the view of the Roman historian Sal-
lust, the greatness of Rome was a result of the competition for glory by
young men who entered the battlefield with a burning desire to beat their
peers by being the first to slay an opponent. In this view, soldiers, although
not per se self-interested, cannot be expected to risk their lives from a sense
of duty alone. Courageous acts should therefore be seen and, more impor-
tantly, praised extensively.
One of the most insightful authors of (early) modernity on military
honor is the now somewhat forgotten Bernard Mandeville, who explained
to his eighteenth century audience that all men ‘love glory,’ and although
“they set out differently to acquire it,” traditionally military exploits have
been the default manner.22 To that end, military commanders flatter and
praise the bold, reward the wounded, and honor the dead to help soldiers
to overcome their natural fear of death. Uniforms, decorations, and fine
phrases about the justness of the cause, despising death and the bed of
honor, provide against little cost the courage money cannot buy; just “put
feathers in their caps, and distinguish them from others (…) and every
proud man will take up arms and fight himself to death.”23 The wish to
avoid being considered a coward was in Mandeville’s judgment by far the
strongest motive for courageous behavior, though: “One man in an army is
a check upon another, and a hundred of them that single and without wit-
ness would be all cowards, are for fear of incurring one another’s contempt
made valiant by being together.”24Increasing their fear of shame makes sol-
diers mindful about their honor.25 Every military commander will there-
fore make sure that
The men are praised and buoyed up in the high value they have for
themselves: their officers call them gentlemen and fellow-soldiers; gen-
21 Cicero, Tusculan Disputations II.58.
22 Bernard Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees: or Private Vices, Public Benefits (Oxford:
The Clarendon Press, 1924), 63. Equally traditionally, however, most philoso-
phers have bemoaned this way to glory.
23 Mandeville, Fable vol. I 233.
24 Mandeville, Fable vol. I 233.
25 Mandeville, Fable vol. II 125.
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erals pull off their hats to them; and no artifice is neglected that can
flatter their pride, or inspire them with the love of glory.26
Nowhere has pride been more encouraged than in the army, and “never
anything had been invented before, that was half so effective to create arti-
ficial courage among military men.”27 Militaries make soldiers courageous
by inspiring them “with as much horror against shame, as nature has given
him against death.”28 But Mandeville himself saw honor definitely not as
something worth dying for, and he cynically rhymed that ‘The soldiers
that were forced to fight, if they survived, got honour by’t.’29
Modern military sociology corroborates the findings of Mandeville,
pointing to the importance of peer pressure and the concern for one’s rep-
utation among colleagues as motivations for physical courage. Only five
percent of the enlisted US men in the Second World War named idealistic
reasons as incentives for courage; they mentioned religion, the wish to end
the war, and strong group bonds much more often.30 According to jour-
nalist and military historian S. L. A. Marshall, that latter factor was the
most powerful. As he wrote in his highly influential Men against Fire, sol-
diers “do not aspire to a hero’s role, but they are equally unwilling that
they should be considered the least worthy among those present (…) per-
sonal honor is the one thing valued more than life itself by the majority of
men.”31 The motivation behind many acts of physical courage thus partly
boils down to being more afraid of being considered a coward than of dy-
ing. A more recent study by the Israeli Defense Force showed that letting
dependents, comrades or the unit down was considered “the most fright-
ening aspect of battle” by well over forty percent of soldiers and officers,
26 Bernard Mandeville, An Enquiry into the Origin of Honour and the Usefulness of
Christianity in War (London: Cass, 1971), 161. He also stressed that Christian
ethics is incapable of inspiring soldiers to sacrifice their lives. Where the honor
ethic expects a man to adore himself and to be prepared to fight all others if nec-
essary, the gospel wants men to worship God and “to make war with themselves.”
Mandeville, Enquiry, 104.
27 Mandeville, Enquiry, 60. It is this same artificial courage, incidentally, that, ac-
cording to Mandeville, also explains the willingness to duel. Mandeville, Fable II,
78.
28 Mandeville, Fable vol. I, 231–232.
29 Mandeville, Fable vol. I 6.
30 Samuel Stouffer, The American Soldier, second volume (Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1949), 108, 150.




whereas death and loss of limb scored considerably lower.32 A 2003 study
into the motivation of US soldiers in Iraq reached similar findings: the re-
searchers found out that soldiers fought for each other, not for abstract no-
tions, including patriotism.33 Armed forces have adapted their organiza-
tion on the assumption that the existence of strong bonds between soldiers
is the most important factor in combat motivation, and every military pro-
motes loyalty to the honor group.34
But honor not only serves as a motive for valor; it can also prevent sol-
dier from acting unethically. According to military historian John Keegan,
for instance, there is still “no substitute for honor as a medium of enforc-
ing decency on the battlefield, never has been and never will be. There are
no judges, more to the point, no policemen at the place where death is
done in combat.”35 Military ethicist Shannon E. French thinks that “when
there is no battlefield, and warriors fight murderers, they may be tempted
to become the mirror image of the evil they hoped to destroy. Their only
protection is their code of honor.”36 According to Nancy Sherman,
Honor, especially in its Homeric mode, where it is linked with machis-
mo and the glory of decoration – still the archetype for many in the
military today – can be a misplaced warrior virtue. But it needn’t be. It
can produce a willingness to take risks to protect those who are not
themselves trained to take risks (2010).37
The first part of Sherman’s remark, however, reminds us of the fact that
there are drawbacks to the way militaries use honor as a means of instilling
courage. Mandeville already pointed out that honor can also have very de-
structive consequences, as a cause of war, and as a cause of atrocities in war
– he regularly refers to the English Civil War of 1642–1651, and the way
Oliver Cromwell turned his soldiers into enthusiastic fighters in that war,
32 Ben Shalit, The Psychology of Conflict and Combat (New York: Praeger, 1988), 10–
13.
33 Leonard Wong, Thomas Kolditz, Raymond Millen and Terrence Potter, ed., Why
They Fight: Combat Motivation in the Iraq War (Carlisle Pa.: U.S. Army War Col-
lege, Strategic Studies Institute, 2003), 9–14, 19.
34 John Keegan, The Face of Battle (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1993), 53 and 72, 73.
35 Cited in Michael Ignatieff, The Warrior’s Honor (New York: Metropolitan Books,
1998), 118.
36 Shannon E. French, The Code of the Warrior: Exploring Warrior Values Past and
Present (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003), 241.
37 Nancy Sherman, “The Guilt They Carry: Wounds of Iraq and Afghanistan,” Dis-
sent, Spring (2010): 80–84. Cf. Peter Olsthoorn, Honor in Political and Moral Philos-
ophy (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2015), 191.
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while at the same time letting them believe they were good, pious Chris-
tians.38 Although in Mandeville’s view principally a self-regarding drive,
honor is clearly something that can induce people to act against their own
immediate interests. Honor can be used in a manipulative way, putting
pressure on soldiers to do things that are definitely not in their own inter-
est. A commander motivated by a desire for fame might endanger both his
men and his mission. David Hume pointed out that although most people
applaud military glory, those ‘of cool reflection are not so sanguine in their
praises of it. The infinite confusions and disorder, which it has caused in
the world, diminish much of its merit in their eyes.’39 Field Marshall
Bernard Montgomery forms an excellent illustration: resentful after Gener-
al Eisenhower took over Ground Forces Command against his wish, Mont-
gomery, in his pursuance of personal glory, took irresponsible risks with
the failed Operation Market Garden; it should have brought him back to
the top position yet in reality spilled the lives of many allied soldiers.
Another drawback of the honor ethic is that it is rather particularistic.
Because honor depends on group norms that not everyone shares, honor-
able behavior and moral behavior are not the same. To what degree honor-
able behavior and moral behavior overlap therefore depends on the pecu-
liarity of group norms. And they can be peculiar: Tolstoy described in An-
na Karenina that for officers the rule is
that one must pay a cardsharper, but need not pay a tailor; that one
must never tell a lie to a man, but one may to a woman; that one must
never cheat anyone, but one may a husband; that one must never par-
don an insult, but one may give one.40
In former days it was considered quite honorable for an officer not to pay
his tailor, to flog a soldier, or to be drunk. Not paying his gambling debts
or not adequately responding to an insult was however deemed very dis-
honorable. Mandeville noticed, somewhat similar to Tolstoy, that a man of
honor
must punctually repay what he borrows at play, though the creditor
has nothing to show for it; but he may drink, and swear, and owe
38 Mandeville, Enquiry, 163–164.
39 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature III.iii.ii. Honor caused more deaths than the
plague, as John G. Peristiany and Julian A. Pitt-Rivers state in a foreword to their
Honor and Grace in Anthropology (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1992).
40 Tolstoy, Anna Karenina, Part III, Chapter 20.
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money to all the tradesmen in town, without taking notice of their
dunning. (…) He must make no attempts upon his friend’s wife,
daughter, sister, or anybody that is trusted to his care, but he may lie
with all the world besides.41
Even though these are (apart from the flogging) relatively innocent exam-
ples that can be remedied, such a particularistic ethics of honor might also
take less harmless and more persistent forms. Some hold, for instance, that
some insight in the way breaches of their honor can cause offense to the
local population, might lead to a better understanding of the mechanisms
behind both terrorism and the rise of the insurgencies in Iraq and
Afghanistan in previous years.
So it seems that the military’s dependence on honor has a final down-
side in an occasional lack of respect for outsiders.42 As one author put it
polemically: “in so far as honor is a relative good, the easiest way to go up
is to push others down. Honor can thus encourage people to humiliate
those over whom they acquire power.”43 Military honor, in its modern
guise of social cohesion, can lead to the kind of group loyalty that is poten-
tially dangerous to those who fall outside the honor group. And it seems
that a soldier’s honor group is nowadays smaller than it used to be: where
an aristocratic warrior of old – say, a knight – would consider an opponent
of an equal social status as belonging to the same honor group, this is dif-
ferent for a modern soldier: most Western soldiers in Iraq in 2003, for ex-
ample, did in all probability not consider enemy combatants as belonging
to the same honor group, let alone local civilians; their honor group would
consist of, first of all their fellow soldiers, and, second, their fellow coun-
tryman. Troops who are trained for combat can therefore experience diffi-
culties in adopting less aggressive ways of working needed during the re-
building phase that starts after major combat is over. Using the old honor
ethic to motivate military personnel is not always in the interest of the peo-
41 Mandeville, Fable vol. I 246. Cleomenes, Mandeville’s spokesperson in the second
volume of the Fable and the Enquiry, thinks it very unreasonable ‘that a de-
bauched fellow, who runs in every tradesman’s debt, and thinks himself not
obliged to pay anything but what is borrowed or lost at play, should claim the
same regard from us [as a man of justice, integrity, temperance, and chastity], for
no other reason than because he dares to fight.’ Mandeville, Enquiry, 90.
42 See also Bertram Wyatt-Brown, “The Ethic of Honor in National Crises: The Civil
War, Vietnam, Iraq, and the Southern Factor,” The Journal of The Historical Society
5 (2005): 4, 449–450.
43 Paul Robinson, “Integrity and Selective Conscientious Objection,” Journal of Mili-
tary Ethics 81 (2009): 34–47.
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ple whose hearts and minds are to be won if it means that they are consid-
ered outsiders that are somewhat less worthy of respect. According to a
2006 report of the U.S. Mental Health Advisory Team, just 47 per cent of
the American soldiers and 38 per cent of the marines in Iraq were of the
opinion that one should treat non-combatants with dignity and respect.
That marines were even less inclined than soldiers to see noncombatants in
Iraq as worthy of respect is probably because group ties among them are
stronger than among soldiers. Marines in Iraq were also less willing to re-
port a colleague who acted unethically than army soldiers. Only 40 percent
of the marines were willing to report a unit member who injured or killed
an innocent noncombatant, against 55 percent of the army soldiers.44
Strong group ties can lead to a form of in-group favoritism that harms the
people the military is supposed to protect, and to a lack of moral courage,
as speaking out against colleagues brings moral disapprobation from one’s
peers.
Cases in point are the Belgian paratroopers and Canadian airborne
troopers that seriously mistreated members of the local population when
on humanitarian mission in Somalia. One Belgian paratrooper urinated on
the face of a dead Somali civilian, and two of his colleagues held a Somali
civilian over an open fire. Both incidents took place in 1993. In that same
year, Canadian airbornes from 2 Commando, known for its strong in-group
loyalty, tortured and murdered a Somali teenager that had tried to access
the Canadian camp – and kept silent about it. Canada disbanded its elite
airborne regiment because of this incident.45 In the well-known Haditha
incident in 2005, in which US Marines shot 24 unarmed civilians after the
death of one of their colleagues in an ambush, the marines involved initial-
ly claimed that 15 civilians were killed by the same roadside bomb that
killed their colleague, and that eight others (at that moment the Iraqi
death toll was thought to be 23) were insurgents killed in the firefight fol-
lowing the attack on their convoy. There have been more of these cover-
ups in recent years, and both the misconduct as the covering up following
it might well be to a large extent consequences of stressing social cohesion.
That the interests of colleagues and the organization are deemed more im-
portant than the safety of the local population might well be an unavoid-
44 Mental Health Advisory Team IV, Operation Iraqi Freedom 05–07 Final Report,
2006, accessed March 27, 2019, http://i.a.cnn.net/cnn/2007/images/05/04/mhat.iv.r
eport.pdf.
45 See for the role of group bonding in this incident: Donna Winslow, “Rites of Pas-




able consequence of stressing group loyalty. In larger society, there seems
to be a general tendency that works in the same direction: we already not-
ed in the introduction of this chapter that, when it comes to losses, civilian
casualties among the local population count for less than Western military
casualties. The most recent example of the tendency to reduce risks for mil-
itary personnel, sometimes (but certainly not always – more on that later)
at the cost of increased risk to the local population, is the increasing use of
unmanned vehicles in the air, commonly called drones.
The use of robots and the honorableness of the military profession
This reduction of risks for military personnel, might have consequences
for (the image of the) military profession. In earlier days, bows, catapults,
and firearms were seen as the weapon of choice for cowards, yet it seems
that robots push things even a bit further by eliminating risk altogether –
which raises the interesting question whether risk is fundamental to the
military profession, and if the exclusion of risk will change it. Now, some
see only advantages in riskless warfare: “I never, ever want to see a Sailor or
a Marine in a fair fight. I always want them to have the advantage,” the US
Admiral Roughead stated after the demonstration of the Rail Gun with a
range of more than 200 miles.46 One could imagine, on the other hand,
that the military profession becomes not only a safer, but also a less honor-
able one: we already noted that honor often involves acting against one’s
own interest (including the preserving of life and limb) to further a higher
interest. Incurring risk to oneself seems to be a vital part of it. It is proba-
bly this idea that led to Susan Sontag’s infamous remark that the 9/11 at-
tackers were more courageous than the pilot who drops his bombs from
high altitude.47 As Alexander Welsh expressed it in his book on honor:
For men to join in battle is generally thought to be honorable, but not
if they are so situated as to be able to kill others without exposing
themselves to danger whatever. On the contrary, the willingness to risk
4.
46 See Global Security, “CNO Observes Successful Rail Gun Demonstration,” ac-
cessed March 27, 2019, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2008/
02/mil-080201-nns04.htm.
47 Susan Sontag, “Talk of the Town,” The New Yorker, September 24, 2001.
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one’s life – it could be in an act of passive resistance – comes as the test
of honor we most often hear invoked.48
Welsh’ remark points to the fact that running no risks and running a limi-
ted risk are not the same, and the difference is not merely gradual. In
Waziristan, the region in Pakistan that has seen a lot of drone attacks on
Taliban leaders, this riskless way of fighting is certainly seen as dishonor-
able.49 Although most people will understandably see that latter fact as
their problem, not ours, it might become our problem too: Baitullah
Mehsud, the Pashtun commander of the Pakistani Taliban, claimed that
each drone attack brought “him three or four suicide bombers,” mainly
from the families of the victims of the drone attacks.50 Using drones is an
effective method, though, killing Mehsud in August 2009.
What’s more, it is rather hard to imagine how one can respect the local
population, a vital element of the hearts and minds approach, from, for in-
stance, a control room in Nevada (where many pilots of Predators and
Reapers work from). Social psychologists point out that dehumanization,
that is, seeing people for something less than human, can open the door to
more serious forms of unethical conduct.51 Social-psychologist Albert Ban-
dura counts it among the “many social and psychological maneuvers by
which moral self-sanctions can be disengaged from inhumane conduct.”52
Reducing enemy combatants to mere blips on a computer screen might
amount to such dehumanization. As was also shown by the famous Mil-
gram experiments on obedience, it is more difficult to be cruel, or indiffer-
ent, when the other has a face.53 At a time that unmanned aerial vehicles
take out insurgents from afar, with someone at the remote who thinks that
his job is “like a video game. It can get a little bloodthirsty. But it’s fucking
cool,”54 that face is most probably not always there. With such a distance –
physical, but also psychological – between a soldier and the horrors of war,
48 Alexander Welsh, What is Honor? A Question of Moral Imperatives (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2008), 4.
49 Mark Thompson and Bobby Ghosh, “The CIA’s Silent War in Pakistan,” Time,
June 1, 2009.
50 Thompson and Ghosh, CIA’s Silent War.
51 Albert Bandura, “Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities,” Per-
sonality and Social Psychology Review (1999): 200.
52 Bandura, Moral Disengagement, 194.
53 Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View (New York: Harper
& Row, 1974).
54 Singer, Wired for War, 332.
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some fear that killing might get a bit easier.55 But then again, Peter Lee de-
scribes in a nuanced article how “the emotional and physical separation of
the remote pilot from events on the ground brings the benefit of increased
objectivity. (…) Physical separation from the combat zone does not, for ex-
ample, automatically lead to emotional disconnection. The crew of a Tor-
nado flying at low level above an enemy contact may be more emotionally
disengaged than the Reaper crew (…).”56 A remark that reminds us of the
important fact that drone pilots do run risks, albeit not to life and limbs:
they are prone to suffer serious amounts of stress, or suffer PTSD or moral
injury.
Finally, one could argue that fighting honorable is fighting within the
limits set by the just war tradition – at the minimum. Now, the risk-trans-
fer by means of UAVs will generally remain within the limits of the “dou-
ble effect” clause of the just war tradition: civilian casualties caused by the
use of drones are an unintended (and can be a proportional) side-effect of
attacks on legitimate targets. It possibly falls short, however, in light of
Walzer’s famous restatement of that clause holding that soldiers have a fur-
ther “obligation to attend to the rights of civilians,” and that “due care”
should be taken, and that soldiers have to do this “accepting costs” to
themselves.57 This adds up to what Walzer calls the idea of double inten-
tion, with the first intention being that it is the intention to hit the target
and not something else, while the second intention consists of two rather
separate aspects: 1) efforts should be made to reduce the number of civil-
ian casualties; 2) when needed at increased risk to oneself. It is of course
the second aspect that is rather demanding, and it is precisely because it is
demanding that we want to see it: we tend to “look for a sign of a positive
commitment to save civilian lives” that tells us that “if saving civilian lives
means risking soldiers’ lives, the risk must be accepted.”58 Although Walz-
er does not invoke the concept of honor here, his emphasizing of the im-
portance of risk acceptance does remind us of that notion. Reminding of
the earlier remark about the Costa Concordia that the captain is “is the last
to leave,” Walzer writes that soldiers “stand to civilians like the crew of a
liner to its passengers. They must risk their own lives for the sake of oth-
ers.”59
55 See also Singer, Wired for War, 395–396.
56 Peter Lee, “Remoteness, Risk and Aircrew Ethos,” Air Power Review 15, No. 1
(2012): 14.
57 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 155.
58 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 156.
59 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 305.
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Now, one could of course argue that the use of UAV’s amounts to the
efforts to reduce the number of civilian casualties that Walzer would like
to see. An UAV can, because it is unmanned (and inexpensive compared to
manned aircraft) fly low and slow, sending back high resolution images to
its operator who should then be able to distinguish combatants from non-
combatants; a technological feat that should make collateral damage in the
form of civilian casualties less likely to occur, as does the fact that drone
pilots, far from the actual battlefield, might be less affected by potentially
hazardous emotions like frustration, boredom, and the (honor driven)
wish for revenge. That drone pilots are in their cubicle perhaps less subject
to the forces of peer pressure and group loyalty than other military person-
nel could makes it easier for them to raise the moral courage that is needed
to make these decisions about life and death in an ethical way.60
Most observers, however, will see the use of UAV’s as falling short in
meeting the demand in the second term (incurring risk to oneself) of
Walzer’s notion of double intention as it boils down to a clear refusal to
accept risks to oneself, and many authors have claimed that this absence of
personal risk is in fact that what makes the use of drones less honorable.
Fighting one’s adversary from a low flying manned aircraft would amount
to a sufficient indication of the acceptance of risk to oneself, but if that
would also increase the risk to the local population one might ask what the
point is. Walzer’s emphasis on “accepting cost to oneself,” stemming from
his wish to see proof of a good intention, does not allow for the possibility
that risks to the local population might be reduced without increasing the
risk to Western military personnel. Dismissing the use of drones because
their use is free of risk and thus dishonorable might thus boil down to ac-
cepting higher risks to oneself and the local population just to prove your
honorableness. As that would be a rather unsatisfying option, we are left
with the question whether the vocabulary of honor is suited to describe
drone warfare to begin with.61 That, as we have seen, the drawbacks of mil-
itary honor are as numerous as the advantages might form another reason
to leave honor out of the equation.62
60 Lee, Remoteness, 15.
61 See also Cora Goldstein, “Drones, Honor, and War,” Military Review, November-
December (2015): 75.
62 See also Robert Sparrow, “Drones, Courage, and Military Culture,” in Routledge
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Niccolò Machiavelli held that in war nothing ever really changes, and he
therefore thought that the invention of the firearm amounted to not much
more than just a new variety of the age-old catapult.63 It is tempting to
think likewise about the use of unmanned systems: a development that
does not really raise issues different from those raised a long time ago by
artillery, and more recently by highflying bombers. In part, there is some-
thing to be said for this view. The use of unmanned systems is part of a
larger tendency of risk minimization, or risk transfer. But in a way Machi-
avelli was, of course, wrong; the invention of the firearm proved as crucial
for the way wars were fought as the spread of the stirrup some thousand
years before. Possibly, the use of unmanned systems will prove to be equal-
ly significant, especially since the development of these systems has only
just begun. Despite initial reluctance, probably due to the perceived dis-
honorableness of their use, militaries have now embraced the use of robots
– just as they have embraced bows and catapults in the earlier days.64 De-
velopments in this area seem to go considerably quicker than those in
what is essentially its reverse image: the development of non-lethal
weapons that minimize risk for outsiders to the organization, such as op-
posing forces and the local population. What’s more, as a result of a lot of
money and effort spent, Western militaries seem to get better at this killing
without getting killed than they already were. However interesting the
matter of drones and honor is, worries about the honorableness of the mil-
itary profession are not going to slow down this development. That, for in-
stance, the future will hold autonomous systems – that is, systems without
a man in the loop – seems almost a given, and that will raise a host of ethi-
cal issues that are truly new, especially concerning the question who can
be held responsible.
Such questions about responsibility are in all probability more pressing
than the question whether the use of drones is honorable or not. Juxtapos-
ing allegedly risk adverse drone pilots with the supposed death wish of,
say, the suicide bombers mentioned in the introduction is not particularly
5.
63 Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince and the Discourses (New York: Modern Library,
1950).
64 Singer, Wired for War, 216–217. Nonetheless, it seems somewhat ironic that
iRobot, a leading manufacturer of robots, named one of its land robots for the
military “Warrior” – which, incidentally, was also the initial name of an upgraded
Predator (the name Reaper for the Predator’s bigger brother, a drone especially
designed as a “hunter-killer,” seems more adequate).
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helpful. It echoes the timeworn rhetoric of a feminine West that occiden-
talists like Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri were eager to use.
Buying into that “you love Pepsi, we love death” rhetoric not only implies
that drone pilots are not honorable because their life is not at risk, but
probably also that we should deem their mirror image, the death seeking
suicide bombers, honorable – not a conclusion many of us would want to
accept. Risk aversion is not bad or dishonorable in itself; it is only a prob-
lem insofar as it comes at the cost of increased risk to the outsiders the mil-
itary should defend if it wants to live up to its professed ambition to be a
force for good. The real issue at stake is that we are more concerned about
casualties among our fellow countrymen than among unknown persons in
far-away countries – this is perhaps to some extent understandable and nat-
ural, but certainly not moral. Or honorable, for that matter.
Peter Olsthoorn
180
